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Sammendrag:.Denne artikkelen ser på betydningen 
av irreversibiliteter i klimapolitikken. Modellen som 
blir presentert her fanger både opp irreversible 
endringer av klimaforandringer som følge av 
klimagassutslipp og irreversibiliteter knyttet til 
utslippsreduserende investeringer, som begge påvirkes 
av usikkerhet som gradvis er i endring pga. læring. 
Klimairreversibilitet knytter en opsjonsverdi til ’tidlig 
handling’ strategien så lenge det er en positiv 
sannsynlighet for at irreversibilitetsskranken er 
bindende. Investeringsirreversibilitet, derimot, skalerer 
ned fremtidige klimaeffekter på samme måte som en 
økning i diskonteringsraten ville gjort. Effekten 
opsjonsverdien av tidlig handling har på 
politikkutformingen reduseres jo mer irreversible 
investeringene er, men denne effekten er mindre jo 
lengre tidsperiodene vi ser på er. Hvilken politikk som 
foretrekkes avhenger av den relative størrelsen på 
disse opsjonsverdiene og på de mulige 
justeringskostnadene. Hvis summen av 
klimaopsjonsverdien og justeringskostnaden forårsaket 
av for beskjedene utslippsreduserende tiltak overgår 
summen av investeringsopsjonsverdien og 
justeringskostnaden forårsaket av for store 
utslippsreduserende tiltak, er nettoopsjonsverdien 
positiv, klimairreversibiliteten dominerer, og ’tidlig 
handling’ bør velges framfor ’vent og se’ strategien.   
 
Abstract: This paper reconsiders the importance of 
irreversibilities in climate change policy. The model 
presented here captures the irreversibility of both 
climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions and 
abatement technology investments, both of which are 
subject to uncertainty that will necessarily change 
gradually over time as a result of learning. The climate 
irreversibility adds an option value to the ‘early 
action’ strategy as long as there is a positive 
probability of encountering the climate irreversibility 
constraint. In contrast, irreversibility in abatement 
investments scales down the future climate effects in 
the same way as an increase in the discount factor 
would. The effect the option value of early abatement 
has on policy making is reduced the more irreversible 
investments are, but this effect decreases with the 
length of the time periods. The preferred policy option 
depends on the relative size of these option values and 
the possible adjustment costs. If the sum of the climate 
option value plus the adjustment costs resulting from 
too low initial abatement exceeds the sum of the 
investment option value plus the adjustment costs 
resulting from too high initial abatement, the net 
option value is positive, the climate irreversibility 
effect dominates, and ‘early action’ should be 
preferred over the ‘wait-and-see’ policy. 
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1 Introduction 
Intuitively it seems very plausible that environmental irreversibilities would play an important 
role in global climate change. In the economics literature, however, this is widely disputed. 
Due to the long time horizon and the uncertainty aspects of the problem, climate change 
policy decisions made today may influence welfare hundreds of years into the future. It is also 
likely that many of the changes caused by global warming will be irreversible. One example 
is the possible change in the path of the Gulf Stream; it can hardly be assumed that it could be 
moved back to its original basin once change has occurred. Another example is that changes 
in the climate might destroy unique ecosystems or drive certain species to extinction if their 
habitats are destroyed. Also, since greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere, the 
emissions themselves are irreversible.4  
 Irreversibilities and learning in environmental economics were first formalized by 
Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974), and the implication for climate change policy 
was to introduce mitigation strategies now to keep future options open (‘early action’). 
However, later contributions (Kolstad 1996a,b; Ulph and Ulph 1995) downplay the 
importance of the irreversibility of climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions 
(henceforth referred to as climate irreversibility) in favor of the irreversibility in abatement 
technology investments (henceforth referred to as investment irreversibility), and thus 
advocate a ‘wait and see’ strategy. The purpose of this paper is to isolate policy effects of 
option values linked to the two irreversibilities and to explore the question: Are 
irreversibilities in climate change important? 
 This question is also addressed in Pindyck (2002), analyzed as an optimal stopping 
problem. He looks at when (if ever) climate policy should be adopted. So adopting a policy 
today competes not only with never adopting the policy, but also with adopting it next year, in 
two years, and so on. He focuses largely on a one-time adoption of an emission reducing 
policy, whereas this paper compares adjustable policies of doing a little, doing a lot, or doing 
something in between. 
 We use a stylized model to highlight three important uncertainty effects on climate 
change policy. The simplicity of the model is chosen to enable an explicit illustration of these 
effects. When uncertainty is high, the likelihood of making a perfect guess is low.  Under a 
process of learning, no matter what strategy is chosen, costs must thus be expected because of 
adjustments desired due to new information. This is the first effect we study. In addition, 
there are two opposing option values of policies that maintain flexibilities: one related to 
climate irreversibility and the other related to investment irreversibility. These conflicting 
irreversibilities were first treated in Kolstad (1996a). He finds that, if the learning process is 
sufficiently slow, compared with the rates of pollution decay, and capital depreciation, 
learning does not influence the decision. However, if learning is significant, the two 
irreversibilities can affect the desired first-period level of emissions in opposite directions. 
The dominate effect is determined by the relative sizes of the rates of pollution decay, and 
capital depreciation, as well as the expectations about damages. We show that the climate 
irreversibility imposes an option value to the ‘early action’ strategy if, and only if, there is a 
positive probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint, and similarly that 
the investment irreversibility imposes an option value to the ‘wait and see’ strategy if, and 
only if, there is a positive probability of encountering the investment irreversibility constraint. 
4 Every gas has a specific atmospheric lifetime – that is, the time it takes before 1/e of an emitted 
quantity of the gas is left in the atmosphere, e.g. 114 years for N2O, 12 years for CH4, and up to 200 
years for CO2. No single lifetime can be defined for CO2 because of the different rates of uptake by 
different removal processes (IPPC 2001). 
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We also show that irreversibility in abatement investments scale down the future climate 
effects in the same way as an increase in the discount factor. Furthermore, the effect the 
option value of early abatement has on current policy choice is reduced the more irreversible 
the investments, but this effect decreases as the time horizon increases.  
Our framework allows a clear distinction between costs caused by desired adjustments due 
to new information and the two opposing option values. The preferred policy option depends 
on the relative size of these option values and of the ex ante adjustment costs. We conclude 
that if the sum of the climate option value plus the expected adjustment cost resulting from 
too low initial abatement exceeds the sum of the investment option value plus the expected 
adjustment cost resulting from too high initial abatement, the net option value is positive, the 
climate irreversibility effect dominates, and ‘early action’ should be preferred over a ‘wait 
and see’ policy.  
2 Background 
Although insights into the basic science of climate change have improved substantially over 
the past decades, there is still uncertainty around almost every aspect of the problem – 
including future levels of emissions, temperature changes resulting from greenhouse gas 
concentrations, impacts from changes in global mean temperature, technological 
developments, and costs of abatement and adaptation. One might think that the degree of 
uncertainty would significantly influence the political processes and decisions, and that the 
economic analyses thus would treat uncertainty as a central feature. Nevertheless, the main 
perceptions about economic issues related to climate change and climate policy, for example 
as assessed and reported by IPCC (2001), are based on deterministic studies. This does not 
necessarily mean that the uncertainties have been ignored, but rather that this part of the 
economics literature is inconclusive. 
One possible explanation is that most of the climate change studies are based on numerical 
models. The uncertainties per se are therefore difficult to trace. Results derived from 
numerical models depend on assumptions about economic relationships such as damage and 
abatement cost functions, which are far from well known. It is therefore difficult to tell, for 
example, how better ability to predict temperature change in the future will affect current 
policy choices, unless we assume that we know all there is to know about possible climate 
change impacts and the costs of mitigation. This is somewhat of a paradox, because the 
impact of learning is one of the main issues that have been studied in analyses of climate 
policy choice under uncertainty. 
 The issue of irreversibility and learning in environmental economics was introduced 
in the seminal papers by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974). Focusing on a one-time 
development decision, their basic idea was that making an irreversible decision induces 
additional costs because the current decision restricts future decision possibilities. This 
implies that an extra value, an option value, properly attaches to the reversible alternatives. 
This is the value of retaining the option to choose any of the alternatives in the light of new 
information – an option that is lost if an irreversible alternative was chosen in the first place. 
Thus, if there is a chance of learning, they argue, it becomes more important to keep future 
options open. With regard to climate change policy, the implication is that the current level of 
greenhouse gas emissions should be lower if there is a possibility of learning more about 
irreversible damages in the future. Arrow and Fisher (1974) refer to this as the ‘irreversibility 
effect.’ 
 Kolstad (1996a,b) and Ulph and Ulph (1995) pointed out that there are two kinds of 
irreversibilities in the context of climate change. In addition to the climate irreversibility, 
there is also the investment irreversibility due to investment in sunk capital. Once the 
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abatement investment has been undertaken, the resulting capital is usually not easily 
converted back to consumption or other forms of capital. These papers downplay the 
importance of climate irreversibility relative to investment irreversibility, and thus conclude 
that the climate irreversibility effect need not dominate for greenhouse gas emissions (see 
Fisher 2001; or Heal and Kriström 2002 for more details). Brekke and Lystad (2000), 
however, observe that Kolstad is not depreciating the capital: his capital lasts forever. They 
show that with a small depreciation rate on capital, Kolstad’s conclusion is turned around.  
Fisher and Narain (2003) observe that in Kolstad (1996b) the obvious reason why there are no 
findings of impacts from climate irreversibility is that, in the parameterization of the model, 
the non-negativity restriction on emissions, used in the model to define emissions 
irreversibility, is never binding. Fisher and Narain (2003) introduce endogenous risk to the 
problem and find that, like emissions irreversibility, this has a positive effect on abatement 
investments. Aaheim (2003), using a stochastic model with Brownian motion, shows that both 
investment irreversibility and climate irreversibility may affect optimal abatement 
significantly, but if the policy is updated frequently in accordance with new information, the 
two effects tend to weigh each other out. 
All in all, the rather sparse economic literature on the implications for the timing of climate 
policy of uncertainty and irreversibility seems to favor the ‘wait and see’ policy over ‘early 
action.’ Fisher (2001) argues that the reason for this result, which may appear counterintuitive 
to most, is that, given the assumptions or parameter values built into the models, there is 
relatively little cost in deferring abatement while waiting to learn more about the benefit. The 
climate irreversibility, therefore, plays less of a role in driving current policy recommendation 
on controlling emissions. 
Contrary to the standard assumptions of economic climate change models, Fisher and 
Narain (2003) assume that the probability of a catastrophic impact at some point in the future 
(the next period), although very small, may be positively related to the level of greenhouse 
gas concentration in the atmosphere; the probability is endogenous. Their model also allows 
for the possibility of regrettable first period investments. Fisher and Narain find the effect of 
the investment irreversibility to dominate the effect of the climate irreversibility essentially 
because the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere does not change much over 
a 10 year period. However, Torvanger (1997), using a three-period stochastic dynamic 
programming model, shows that in the case of endogenous probability of irreversible climate 
change the climate irreversibility effect dominates. 
The difference between a static and a dynamic analysis under uncertainty is that the 
decisions are taken sequentially in dynamic analyses. While a static problem gives a best 
solution once and for all, a dynamic problem aims at finding the best strategy under a given 
set of information. This is why learning becomes relevant: If uncertainty affects the decision, 
future amendments to information will change decisions in the future. Whether decisions of 
today are affected by future learning therefore depends on whether future decisions depend on 
present decisions, or, in the words of the option value literature, whether present decisions are 
irreversible. 
The alternative strategies can be illustrated schematically by Figure 1. This is a two-period 
decision tree with alternative strategy paths. The dotted paths in the middle represent static 
expected utility maximization without learning. According to this strategy, at time t = 0 (the 
first decision node) we choose abatement levels based on a weighted sum of the probabilities 
of states (our expectations). The probabilities are formed in accordance with our beliefs. If 
damages turn out to be high, we get the net benefit of ; and if they turn out to be low, we 
get . The outer branches represent sequential decision paths: At time t = 0 we have to 
decide which state we perceive as the most likely, and choose our first period abatement level 
accordingly . Either way we risk making the wrong guess. The actual state is, however, now 
H
EUB
L
EUB
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revealed at time t = 1. This means that if we initially made the wrong guess we can now 
adjust our abatement effort according to the new available information. If we guess the state 
of damages to be low at t = 0 (the left hand side in figure 1), the net benefit is if we are 
correct and  if we are wrong. If we guess the state of damages to be high, the net benefit is 
 if we are right and  if we are wrong. Regardless of our choice of path, we  
L
RB
L
WB
H
RB
H
WB
BLW BLEU
                       
H
WB
 
EB  T= 0
EBL EBH
No 
learning
BLR B
H
R
BHWB
H
EU
T = 1
 
Figure 1: Alternative decision strategy paths 
 
get a lower benefit if we make the wrong guess because the level of first period abatement is 
not chosen optimally.5 
Such a sequential decision-making process aims to identify short-term strategies in the face 
of long-term uncertainties. The next several decades will offer many opportunities for 
learning and mid-course corrections. The relevant question is not “What is the best course of 
action for the next 100 years?”, but rather “What is the best course for the near-term given the 
long-term objective?” (IPPC 2001).  
3 What can we expect to learn about climate change? 
There is a vast amount of ongoing research aimed at improving our understanding of the 
implications of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. We will therefore learn more 
about the problem in the future, and most likely the scientific background for climate policy 
                              
5 The benefits in Figure 1 are in arbitrary order. Generally we can only say that >  and 
> . 
H
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will improve. To the extent that learning has an influence on decision making, it should 
therefore be taken into account also in current climate policy choice.  
However, a better understanding of climate change issues does not necessarily mean less 
uncertainty. The connection between uncertainty and the state of knowledge is illustrated by 
comparing reports from the UN Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC). The 
Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1995) estimates that a doubling of CO2 concentrations in 
the atmosphere (2 x CO2) will lead to a global mean temperature increase between 1.8 ºC and 
4.2 ºC. In the Third Assessment Report (IPCC 2001), the possible range of the future increase 
in global mean temperature increased to between 1.4 ºC and 5.6 ºC. The reason for the 
increase in uncertainty is improved knowledge in the underlying science linking greenhouse 
gas emissions to atmospheric accumulation and global temperature change. A better and more 
precise description of the relationships between policy, economic and human development 
and emissions, on the one hand, and atmospheric processes, on the other, improved the 
consistency between the scenarios in the Third Assessment Report (TAR), and resulted in a 
wider range of possible outcomes. 
The Third Assessment Report was the first to also indicates the degree of uncertainty 
associated with its predictions by stating the degree of confidence the leading authorities in 
the field of climate change report with their forecasts, ranging from ‘very high’ (≥95%) to 
‘very low’ (≤5%). Most of its findings are assigned a probability ranking (see the TAR or e.g. 
Heal and Kriström (2002) for more details). Even though improved knowledge may not 
reduce the total uncertainty in the future, the aspect of learning is still important, simply 
because some of the uncertainty is resolved as time goes by. Just as it is easier today to 
predict the climate in 2010 than in 2100, it will be easier in 2090 than it is today to predict the 
climate in 2100.  
To illustrate this more or less passive way of learning, consider the price of crude oil over 
the past 30 years. In the wake of oil price hikes in the 1970s, significant effort was put into 
forecasting the oil price around 1980. Forecasts were based on uncertainty and Hotelling’s 
rule,6 which predicted an increase in the price of exhaustible resources, such as petroleum.  
Figure 2 shows the actual development of oil prices from 1970 to 2000. Most forecasts of 
the trend made in the early 1980s were found in the upper half of the area between the dotted 
lines, typically in the range between US$ 35 and US$ 55, in real terms.7 Thus, most 
pessimistic (low price) forecasts turned out to be far too optimistic. However, one cannot 
claim that oil price changes are better understood today than they were 20 years ago. It may 
be granted that the importance of the Hotelling rule was exaggerated, but this is also a result 
of past observations. Therefore, a forecast for the year 2000 made the year before with the 
same uncertainty had, of course, a much higher probability of being correct than a forecast 
made in 1980. The main point is that short-term predictions are more accurate than long-term 
predictions, since learning occurs along the way, regardless of whether the uncertainty has 
decreased. 
6 See e.g. Hanley et al (1997) for a description of Hotelling’s rule. 
7 Lorentsen et al. (1985) denotes by US$ 20 a ‘collapse price scenario.’ 
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Figure 2. Spot prices for Saudi light (1970–1979) and Brent Blend (1980–2000) 
in nominal prices and real 1990 prices. 
 
One may expect that gradual resolution of uncertainty will be considered the main source 
of learning in the climate policy process, at least in the foreseeable future. Some of the 
uncertainty may be irreducible in principle, and hence decision makers will have to continue 
to take action under significant degrees of uncertainty. Thus, the problem of climate change 
evolves as a subject of risk management in which strategies should be reformulated as new 
knowledge arises (IPPC 2001). 
4 Irreversibilities and option values 
This section analyses the abatement decision taken by an agent subject to uncertainty both in 
benefits of mitigating climate change (damages) and in abatement technology investment 
costs. We will concentrate on irreversibility in one of these variables at a time to see how both 
types of irreversibility affect the optimal solution. We start with a presentation of the general 
two-period model with uncertainty and learning. Then, we analyze the case of climate 
irreversibility, which corresponds to the traditional option value discussion. Next, we look at 
how investment irreversibility may affect the solution. 
4.1 A two-period model with a binary distribution of outcomes 
We consider climate policy over two periods, ‘the present’ and ‘the future.’ We do not 
discount ‘the present,’ hence this is referred to as period 0, and ‘the future’ is referred to as 
period 1. Without abatement, emissions of greenhouse gases are fixed in both periods and 
denoted e0 and e1, in the initial and future time periods, respectively. Abatement may be 
invoked in either period at costs of a0 and a1, respectively. The abatement cost per unit of 
emissions cut, ct, is assumed to be independent of scale in each period. Hence, the actual 
abatement is a0/c0 in period 0 and a1/c1 in period 1. 
The emissions of greenhouse gases in period t can then be written as [et  -  at/ct].  
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These add to the previous level of concentrations of greenhouse gases, denoted by yt-1. Then, 
the development in atmospheric concentration8 can be written yt = yt-1 + et – at/ct. For the 
two specific periods we have: 
   
0
0
00 ˆ c
a
eyy −+= , (1) 
 
1
1
101 c
aeyy −+= , (2) 
where the historical level of concentrations, ŷ, is assumed known.  
Assume, moreover, that the relationship between concentrations and economic damages 
has a logarithmic form, with an exponent larger than one.9 Without loss of generality, we 
choose a quadratic damage function for the sake of simplicity, f(yt) = αyt2, where α is a 
constant. (See e.g. Aslaksen (1990) for a discussion on the choice of exponent.)  
Recall that the periodic emissions levels are exogenously given. The benefits of abatement 
can thus be expressed by the damage avoided. For the initial period, this is 
 
))ˆ()ˆ(())()ˆ(()( 2
0
0
0
2
000000 c
a
eyeyqyfeyfqyb −+−+=−+= αα  (3) 
 
where q0 is the price on damages or the willingness to pay for avoiding them in period 0. 
Similarly, the benefits of abatement in the future can be written, 
 
 
))ˆ()ˆ(())()ˆ(()( 2
1
1
0
0
10
2
10111011 c
a
c
aeeyeeyqyfeeyfqyb −−++−++=−++= αα   (4) 
 
In the initial period, there is certainty about present costs and benefits but uncertainty about 
the state in period 1 (the future). Furthermore, assume that learning takes place during the 
initial period, such that the decisions in the future are adjusted according to this new 
information. Since we simplify the problem to look at two periods, this is modeled as if the 
future decisions are made under full certainty. However, when we assume that the 
uncertainties resolve in the future, we refer only to the information revealed since we made 
the initial policy decision. In real life there will be substantial uncertainty remaining also in 
the future.  
When deciding upon abatements, we take into account that our initial decisions will 
influence future benefits. We simplify the uncertainty by considering only two future states of 
                                                     
8 Note that concentrations are usually measured in terms of parts per million or billion by volume 
(ppmv and ppbv respectively), whereas emissions are measured in tons. We therefore convert 
emissions to concentration units and calculate costs in corresponding terms. 
9 The usual choice in economic studies is somewhere between 2 and 3. 
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the world: low damages (state A) and high damages (state B). Denote by π the probability of 
state A. 
A standard expected utility maximizing agent determines 
 




+
−= ∑
=
1
0, )1(
)(
max
10 t
t
tt
aa r
ayb
EW , (5) 
where E is the expectations operator over possible outcomes, and r is the discount rate. Note 
that, so far, we have not taken any kind of irreversibility into account. That is, the solution to 
this problem gives the optimal policy, from the initial-period perspective, when there are no 
other restrictions.  
 
Inserting for b(yt) we can write the welfare function as  
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Assume that the  damage cost function  has a quadratic form  and that uncertainty 
in period 1 is characterized by two states, A and B with a vector of outcomes, x = (q1 , α1 , 
c1).such that  
2)( tt yyf α=
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Then, the first order condition for abatement in period 0 can be written as: 
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where αi is the initial damage per unit concentration, that is, the damage of an increase in 
concentrations by, for example, 1 ppmv carbon from “today” if the present damage is zero. 
The term t
t
tt y
c
qα2
 is the marginal damage per euro of abatement when the concentration 
level is yt. This term may be interpreted as the shadow price of concentrations at level yt, and 
because of the quadratic damage function it is linear in the level of concentrations.  
 
Similarly, the first order condition for abatement in the future period can be written as: 
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  (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) imply that the marginal expected value of the concentrations in each 
period should be equal to 1, which is the marginal cost of abatement in value terms.  
 
In order to simplify the expressions, define the following constants: 
 
 1
2
)1(
2
1
ˆ2
)ˆ(
0
11
0
1110
0
00
00 −

 −++
++++=
c
q
c
q
r
eey
c
qeyC
BBAA απαπα , 
  
 1
2
)1(
2
)ˆ(
1
11
1
11
101 −

 −+++= B
BB
A
AA
c
q
c
qeeyC απαπ . 
 
C0 and C1 are both expressions for the maximum of expected marginal damage per euro 
abatement., They both refer to the concentrations with no abatement, that is ’business as 
usual’, but differ in terms of reference to abatement cost and the length of the period for 
which abatement will work. Thus  C0 refers to abatement in period 0, and C1 to abatement in 
period 1, Moreover, define  
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Instead of interpreting these constants note that  Фiat (i = 0.1) is a parallel to the marginal 
expected benefit of the abatement quantity at/ct (t = 0,1) emissions over the periods that the 
abatement works. ψiat is the marginal expected benefit of the abatement of the quantity at/ct 
the period i  t≠
 
Now the first order conditions can be written as the linear equation system: 
 
 10000 aaC Ψ+Φ= , (9) 
 11011 aaC Φ+Ψ= . (10) 
 
Equations (9) and (10) require that the maximum marginal damage of concentrations without 
abatement in each period equal the marginal benefit of abatement in optimum. Now the level 
and the distribution of abatement in the two periods can be written as two linear functions in 
a0 and a1. We rewrite (9) and (10) and get 
 
Period 0: 1
0
0
0
0
0 a
C
a Φ
Ψ−Φ=  (11) 
 
Period 1: 1
1
1
1
1
0 a
Ca Ψ
Φ−Ψ=  (12) 
These two linear functions express the trade-off between abatement costs in the two periods. 
Thus, for period 0, a reduction of 1 € in present abatement cost, a0, must be replaced by an 
increase of ψ0/Ф0 € in period 1 in order to keep marginal costs equal to marginal benefits. 
For period 1, a 1 € reduction in period 0 must be replaced by increased abatement cost of 
Ф1/ψ1 € in period 1, if marginal costs are to be equal to marginal benefits.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the optimal allocation of abatement costs in the two periods. The curves 
correspond to (11) and (12) and represent all abatement allocations whereby equal marginal 
costs equal marginal benefits. That is, the period 0 curve shows all combinations of a0 and a1 
that satisfy the first order condition for period 0, and the period 1 curve shows all 
combinations that satisfy the first order condition for period 1. Where the curves intercept, 
both conditions are satisfied simultaneously.  
Abatement costs for period 0 start at a lower level and increase at a lower rate compared to 
the line for period 1. From the definitions of the constants, ψ0/Ф0 < Ф1/ψ1, unless there is 
large uncertainty in abatement costs (see appendix). If so, the trade-off curve is steeper in 
period 1 than in period 0. Then, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for interior solution 
is that C1/ψ1 > C0/Ф0. Alternatively, if Ф1/ψ1 < ψ0/Ф0 we must have C1/ψ1 < C0/Ф0 to obtain 
an interior solution. It is seen from the definition of C1 and C0 that this depends on the 
relationship between damage costs and abatement costs in period 0 and period 1. ‘Corner 
solutions’ with abatement in only one period is possible, but the following discussion will be 
based on the case of an interior solution. Then a reduction in present abatement may be 
compensated by more abatement in the future.  
 The optimal solution is found where the two lines intersect. Consider an allocation 
with abatement in period 0 only. Then the total benefit of abatement would be C0/Ф0. This 
value, however, would increase if some abatement were postponed to period 1. Reallocation 
from today until the future would, in fact, increase the total benefit of abatement until the two 
lines intersect. From this point on, further reallocation of abatement between the two periods 
will give lower total benefit. Intertemporal optimality is therefore attained at the intersection. 
 
a
a0
1
Period 1
Period 0
a1
a0
 
Figure 3. Optimal allocation of abatement between the present and the future 
 
Changes in the parameters will affect total abatement, as well as the allocation between the 
periods. If q1α1 increases, the constants for abatement assigned to both periods increase, but 
more so in equation (12), which applies for the future (period 1), than in equation (11), which 
applies for the present (period 0). Also the multiplicative term in equation (11) increases, 
while the multiplicative term in equation (12) is unchanged. In sum, both total and future 
abatement increase compared with present abatement. An increase in the expected unit cost of 
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future abatement does not affect the constant term, but reduces the multiplicative term for 
period 0. The constant term for period 1 decreases, while the multiplicative term in period 1 
increases. All these three shifts thus contribute to an allocation of abatement from the future 
to the present.  
An increase in the discount rate affects only the abatement assigned to period 0 in this 
model. The effect is that the present value of abatement in period 1 is reduced. This 
contributes to a reduction of the abatement in period 0. At the same time, abatement in period 
1 becomes relatively less expensive. This tends to change the trade-off between abatement in 
the two periods. Both effects reduce abatement in period 0. Some may be allocated to period 
1, but the total amount is likely to be unchanged.10 
Changes in uncertainty on future beliefs will also affect optimal abatement in the two 
periods. One exception is the case where there is uncertainty only in future damage costs, 
while the future abatement costs are certain. Appendix 1 shows that all the above-defined 
constants remain unaffected if the expected damage remains unchanged. However, if future 
damage costs are certain, but abatement costs for this period are not, we show in the appendix 
that the constants will increase. Except for the constant term in equation (11), the terms in 
equations (11) and (12) will also be affected. The multiplicative term for period 0 increases, 
while both terms for period 1 decrease. All changes contribute to a reallocation of abatement 
from the present to the future. 
An illustration of the case with uncertain damages is given in Figure 4A. This is simply a 
more complicated version of Figure 3, where there is uncertainty regarding the position of the 
trade-off curves. Figure 4A displays two alternative trade-off curves between the abatement in 
period 0 (the present) and period 1 (the future): one pair representing state A (low future 
damage costs) where the optimal solution is a0A and a1A(right), and one pair representing state B 
(high future damage costs), where the optimal choice is a0B and a1B(right). These two solutions 
are to be considered the boundaries for the abatement choices. The rational decision maker 
would choose an allocation between the two extremes, based on his subjective probability 
distribution over states. For example, insertion of the parameters in equations (11) and (12) 
gives the best ex ante allocation of abatement investments for the expected utility maximizer. 
a1
a0
a1B(right)
a0B
a0A
a1A(right)
Period 1
Period 0
 
Figure 4A. Optimal abatement allocation when damage costs are uncertain 
                                                     
10 Appendix 2 shows the changes in these parameters for a specific numerical example. 
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Because of uncertainty, the initial period decision is based on guesses about the future state 
of the world and the amount of next period abatement. If learning takes place (uncertainty is 
lessened) before the final decision for the next period, the decision maker may want to make 
adjustments to her beliefs in period 0. Irreversibilities place a constraint upon these 
adjustments which will be addressed below, but let us first take a closer look at the costs of a 
policy adjustment. As a benchmark, assume that the initial period decision is based 
exclusively on beliefs about either state A (the lower pair of trade-off curves) or B (the upper 
pair of trade-off curves) in Figure 4A, and not on maximization of expected utility. 
Furthermore, assume that one of these states is realized in period 1. If the guess is right, future 
abatement (a1) will be chosen as predicted. If the guess is wrong, however, period 1 
abatement should be adjusted according to the new information. Since the choice of initial 
period abatement (a0) was conditioned upon a guess about a1, the benefits will be higher when 
the guess is right. The situation for when the guess is as wrong as it can get is illustrated in 
Figure 4B. Here we put all our eggs in one basket, but after learning we wish we had put them 
in the other. The best abatement solutions after learning that the guess was wrong are marked 
a1A(wrong) and a1B(wrong,) respectively (see below for explanations).  
 
a1
a0
a1A(wrong)a1A(right)
a0B
a0A
a1B(wrong) a1B(right)
Period 1
Period 0
 
Figure 4B. Cost of guessing wrong under damage cost uncertainty 
Recall that each curve represents abatement allocations that satisfy the period’s first order 
condition for optimal abatement, and that the social loss of guessing wrong can be measured 
in present value terms. According to the objective function (6), this can be measured by 
differences in initial (period 0) abatement costs. In Figure 4B these losses are indicated by the 
two vertical lines to the left of the a0-axis. The black dotted line represents the loss incurred 
when the wrong guess was the high damage cost scenario, and the grey one the loss for when 
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the wrong guess was the low cost alternative, and in both cases the other extreme was learned 
to be the real state of the world. The explanation goes as follows:  
Start with supposing we based our decision on the high damage cost scenario (early action). 
Then the initial period choice of abatement cost was a0B. Suppose further that at the start of 
the next period we discover that damage costs are instead low. Thus, now we wish we had 
chosen a0A initially, but since we cannot move back in time, this is no longer a possible 
option. For the optimality condition to hold for period 1, abatement cost must be on the period 
1 trade-off curve for state A, and the best move is to choose a1B(wrong). This is a reduction 
compared with our initial guess for period 1 abatement, and the social loss of guessing wrong 
can be measured by the difference between the a0 value where a1B(right) crosses the trade-off 
curve for period 0 in scenario A and the a0 value that was chosen, namely a0B. This social loss 
is thus the difference between what we thought our initial abatement was worth and what it 
turned out to be worth according to the information received. Since we abated too much in 
period 0, the initial abatement is worth less than we thought. The loss is illustrated by the 
black dotted line along the a0-axis.  
Suppose instead that the initial guess is the low damage cost alternative (wait-and-see). The 
period 0 abatement cost is then a0A. Suppose further that at the start of the period 1, we 
discover that costs instead are high. Since the optimal allocation for state B is no longer 
attainable, the best we can do is to satisfy the optimality condition for period 1, given this new 
information. In this situation we abated too little initially and have to compensate by abating 
more than we thought we would in period 1. The best choice is a1A(wrong). The social loss of 
guessing wrong, in this case, can be measured as the difference between a0A and the a0 –value 
where a1A(wrong) intersects with the trade-off curve for period 0 in state B. The loss is illustrated 
by the grey dotted line along the a0-axis in Figure 4B. 
4.2 Irreversible emissions of greenhouse gases. 
So far, we have imposed no restriction on possible abatement in each period. Since emissions 
of greenhouse gases are considered irreversible, however, abatement in each period cannot 
exceed the emissions in that period. This gives the constraint  
 
  (13) 111 eca
∗∗ ≤
 
where c*1 is the actual unit costs in period 1 and a1* is the optimal abatement cost in this 
period. (Note that both c1 and e1 are exogenous.) If the decision in the initial period was based 
on a prediction of higher future abatement than c1*e1, the optimal solution cannot be achieved. 
If future emissions are low or uncertainty is large, or both, there will be a positive probability 
for encountering this irreversibility constraint. The lower we set present abatement, the higher 
is this probability, and an extra value thus attaches to the choice of high initial abatement. 
This is the option value of early abatement.  
Assume that there is uncertainty in the damage costs only and that these turn out to be 
higher than expected. Initial abatement was then lower than optimal, when evaluated in 
hindsight. A relative loss has therefore occurred and adjustments are needed. In this case 
abatement will have to be adjusted upwards, something that can cause a violation of the 
maximum abatement constraint (13). If (13) is violated, the optimal level of abatement is not 
attainable, the climate irreversibility constraint is binding, and the best we can do is to choose 
the maximum level of abatement.  
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a1
a0
a1A(wrong)a1A(right)
a0B
a0A
a1max
a1B(wrong) a1B(right)
Period 1
Period 0
Climate option value
 
Figure 4C. Cost of guessing wrong under climate irreversibility 
The option value of early abatement is illustrated in Figure 4C.  The maximum period 1 
abatement (a1max) is illustrated by the vertical dotted line. Suppose, as a benchmark, we 
choose a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy and base our initial period decision on low damages (state 
A). Suppose further that we learn that damages instead are high. We thus want to choose 
abatement costs equal to a1A(wrong) . This point is, however, to the right of a1max. Since we 
cannot choose an abatement cost level that is higher than the maximum, the climate 
irreversibility constraint is binding. The second best solution is thus not reachable, and the 
best we then can do is to choose a1 equal to a1max. The social loss from guessing wrong is 
represented by the grey line along the a0-axis, where the solid segment represents the option 
value, and the dotted segment represents adjustment costs11. Thus, the loss imposed if the 
climate irreversibility constraint is encountered adds to the costs of the ‘ordinary’ adjustments 
to resolved uncertainty.  The black dotted line to the left of the a0-axis is the same as in Figure 
4B and represents the loss when the ‘early action’ policy is chosen and we learn that we 
should have chosen ‘wait-and-see’. 
In the special case of the figure, if wrong, the total cost of assuming low damages exceeds 
the total cost of assuming high damages. Whether this is the case depends on the extent of the 
option value of early abatement. The option value depends on the probability of encountering 
the climate irreversibility constraint, which depends on a1max, and the maximum possible 
abatement depends on the periodic emissions, which are exogenously given. In the special 
                                                     
11 The graphic representations shows the relative, rather than the actual, size of the different costs 
linked to the three uncertainty effects studied. 
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case of Figure 4C, the irreversibility constraint will be encountered under high damage costs 
if the policy in period 0 is based on low damage costs. Note that a1A(wrong) represents the 
maximum possible abatement that the decision maker might want to choose in period 1. 
Hence, if a1max is to the right of a1A(wrong), there is no option value of early abatement. Kolstad 
(1996b) does not have a binding climate irreversibility constraint, which means that there is 
no option value of early abatement, and the climate irreversibility therefore, by assumption, 
has no impact on decisions.  
If instead the damage costs turn out to be lower than initially expected, one could think of a 
situation where it is optimal to emit more than e1. This constraint does not depend on the 
initial period decision, as in this subsection, but the likelihood of encountering it is of course 
higher with higher initial levels of abatement. 
Recall that the rational decision maker will choose an allocation between the two extremes 
discussed above. Figure 4D illustrates the option value when the decision is based on 
expected utility maximization. Compared to Figure 4C, the trade-off curves for state A and B 
are now dotted. The solid lines in between are the ones that apply for expected utility 
maximization with equal probabilities (π = 0.5). The optimal ex ante solution is a0Exp and 
a1Exp.   
 
a1
a0
a1A
amax
a1B
Period 1
Period 0
a0Exp
a1Exp
Climate option value {
 
Figure 4D. Cost of guessing wrong under expected utility maximization 
 
The social losses of guessing wrong are represented by the vertical lines to the left of the 
a0-axis. Again we look at the most serious mistakes. First, take the case where we learn at the 
end of period 0 that the state of the world is low damage costs (state A).  Since we cannot do 
anything about our period 0 abatement cost choice, we must compensate by lowering the 
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period 1 abatement cost until the first order condition for this period is satisfied, namely to a1A 
in Figure 4D.  The loss can be measured as the difference between a0Exp and the a0 value at the 
point where a1A crosses the period 0 trade-off curve for state B. It is represented by the black 
dotted line to the left of the a0-axis. 
Second, suppose instead that we learn that the state of the world is high damage costs (state 
B). We then wish we had done more initially, and this must be compensated for by increasing 
future abatement. To satisfy the first order condition for period 1, we must choose a1B. This 
level is, however, not attainable since it is to the right of a1max. The best we can do then is to 
choose period 1 abatement equal to a1max. The cost of guessing wrong is represented in the 
figure by the grey line to the left of the a0-axis, where the solid segment is the option value 
and the dotted segment is the adjustment cost. 
To conclude so far, the option value of early abatement relates only to the costs of meeting 
the climate irreversibility constraint. Under a process of learning, additional costs will occur 
because of adjustments desired as a result of new information. In the model discussed here, 
the costs related to these adjustments depend on the slope and the position of the trade-off 
curves for the two periods. These positions depend on the choice of damage functions and 
abatement costs, and to which of these that are being subject to uncertainty. For example, 
Figure 4 is restricted to uncertainty in damage costs. If abatement costs are uncertain, the 
slope of the trade-off curve for period 0 becomes less steep for high costs without changing 
the intersection with the a1-axis. The trade-off curve for period 1 shifts downwards and 
becomes steeper. Therefore, whether a ‘wait and see’ type policy should be preferred to ‘early 
action’, or vice versa, depends on the specification of the model. The only conclusion so far, 
unless a numerical study is carried out, is that the climate irreversibility imposes an option 
value to the ‘early action’ strategy as long as there is a positive probability of encountering 
the climate irreversibility constraint. This is, however, not sufficient for recommending such a 
strategy, because such a recommendation also requires that the option value exceed the loss 
resulting from not following the expected utility choice in period 0. On the other hand, the 
‘wait-and-see’ option can never be expected to do better than maximization of expected utility 
when there is climate irreversibility only. The expected cost of encountering the climate 
irreversibility constraint always is higher in the ‘wait-and-see’ policy option, unless additional 
restrictions are imposed. 
4.3 Irreversible abatement technology investments 
The model (1) to (4) assumes that the abatement level is set in each period, independent of 
previous actions. As Kolstad (1996a,b) and Ulph and Ulph (1995) point out, when focusing 
on the importance of irreversibility, it would be particularly inappropriate to disregard the fact 
that capital costs contribute to a large share of the costs of mitigating climate change. These 
investments are to a large degree sunk, thereby representing an irreversible cost.  
Capital irreversibility is easily included in our model. We include the initial investment costs, 
a0/c0, also in the next period, that is, if the rate of depreciation is zero. Equation (2) is replaced 
with 
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The capital irreversibility has two implications for future options. First, the limit for the 
possible minimum level of concentrations in period 1 is lowered, as long as a0 > 0, because 
the initial abatement investments will lower the emissions also in the future period. 
Consequently, the option value of damages, the value of keeping open the option of further 
increasing the abatement in the future, will be reduced. Second, the maximum level of 
concentrations in the future is now y0 + e1 – a0/c0 compared with y0 + e1 in the previous 
sections. This means that now the maximum level of abatement in the future also depends on 
the investment decision taken initially. In other words, a wrong guess in period 0 may lead to 
negative optimal abatement in period 1. Since negative abatement is not possible, an extra 
cost may occur in period 1 because of the positive probability of encountering this capital 
constraint. This we choose to call the option value of late investments. Inserting for (5) in the 
benefit function yields 
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(15) 
which corresponds to equation (4) above.  
The introduction of capital irreversibility thus implies that the initial abatement becomes 
‘twice as important’ as before. Apart from this, the model is unchanged. The optimal solution 
can, in principle, thus be discussed within the same framework as in section 4.1 and 4.2. 
However, with capital irreversibility, the constants C0, Ф0 and ψ0 change to 
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while the expressions for C1, Ф1 and ψ1 are unaltered. Note that in this model, capital 
irreversibility with no depreciation implies only that the discount term 1/(1+r) is doubled. 
Ceteris paribus this leads to an allocation of abatement from period 1 to period 0. Total 
abatement is, however, likely to decrease. (See the discussion in section 4.1.) 
Compared to Figure 4, the introduction of capital irreversibility leads to a positive shift in 
the trade-off curves for period 0, and they also become steeper, since ψ0/Ф0 < ψ0*/Ф0*. The 
probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint is thus lowered. Recall that 
this constraint is due to the restriction a1 ≥ 0; we cannot have negative abatement. The 
 
 
18
CICERO Working Paper 2003:04  
 Option Values and the Timing of Climate Policy 
 
 
likelihood of encountering this constraint depends on the exogenous emissions under 
“business as usual” in the future (e1).  
a1
a0
a1B
Period 0
Period 1
a0Exp
a1Exp0a1
A
Investment option value {
 
Figure 5. Cost of guessing wrong under irreversible investments and expected 
utility maximization 
The option value of late investment is illustrated in Figure 5. If the decision in period 0 is 
based on expected utility maximization with equal probabilities, we choose a0Exp, expecting to 
choose a1Exp in period 1. If the low damage outcome occurs in period 1, it turns out that a0Exp 
was more than enough for both periods. The optimal choice, according to the new 
information, is to lower a1 until the low damage cost trade-off curve for period 1 is reached 
(the state A curve). In Figure 5 this point is to the left of the a0 axis and is not attainable due 
to the requirement of non-negative investments. The loss due to this overinvestment can be 
measured by the difference between the chosen policy, a0Exp, and the value of a0 where a1 = 0 
crosses the low damage cost trade-off curve for period 0. The loss is indicated by the black 
bar along the a0 axis in Figure 5, where the option value of late investment represents the 
solid segment.   
Correspondingly, the loss when the high damage cost scenario is realized is the difference 
between the a0 –value at the point were a1B crosses the trade-off curve for period 0 in the high 
damage cost state and a0Exp. This is indicated by the grey dotted line to the left of the a0 axis 
in Figure 5. 
Note that we cannot say whether it is the climate irreversibility constraint or the investment 
irreversibility constraint that represent the larger ex ante costs. This depends on the choice of 
parameters, and the ‘business-as-usual’ emissions. It may be noted, however, that a doubling 
of the discount factor to account for the investment irreversibility represents the maximum 
possible implication of this irreversibility, namely for the case where the rate of capital 
depreciation is zero, which is equivalent to the case analyzed by Kolstad (1996b). Introducing 
depreciation would reduce this term to somewhere between 1 and 2, depending on the rate of 
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depreciation. If the periods under consideration are 20–25 years or more, the term is probably 
close to 1, which would be equivalent to case analyzed by Arrow and Fisher and Henry 
discussed in Section 4.2. Note, however, that climate irreversibility is also subject to 
‘depreciation,’ but the time perspective is substantially longer. The concentrations of CO2, for 
example, are reduced by 2/3 over a period of 150–200 years, and 10 percent of emissions will 
remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years. 
Thus, within the framework of this model, the introduction of irreversibility in investments 
is not likely to have large impact. In principle, the requirement for an option value of early 
abatement to arise is similar to the case of reversible damage costs. However, the investment 
irreversibility scales down the future climate effects in the same way as an increase in the 
discount factor would. This implies that the possible cost of choosing a too low initial level of 
abatement is smaller. The conclusion is nevertheless similar: whether or not a possible option 
value of early abatement has an effect on policy making partly depends on the degree of 
climate irreversibility, but this effect is reduced the more irreversible investments are. This 
last effect is, however, smaller the longer the time periods we make decisions for. We 
interpreted this as having two option values that point in different directions, and whether the 
preferred policy option is ‘early action’ or ‘wait and see’ depends on the relative size of these 
option values plus the possible adjustment costs. If the sum of the climate option value plus 
the adjustment costs due to too low initial abatement exceeds the sum of the investment 
option value plus the adjustment costs due to too high initial abatement, the net option value 
is positive, the climate irreversibility effect dominates, and ‘early action’ should be preferred. 
This shows that it is not possible to advocate either ‘early action’ or a ‘wait-and-see’ 
strategies merely on the basis of the existence of irreversibilities, nor on a direct comparison 
of option values. The additional adjustment costs resulting from deviation from expected 
utility maximization, which ex ante are always non-negative, must also be considered. 
5 Decision criteria 
The question of irreversibilities in climate change policy has traditionally been addressed in 
an expected utility framework. In fact, all the papers cited above use this framework, and this 
literature indicates that climate irreversibilities should not have too much impact on the 
design of climate policy. It would be interesting to reconsider this result under alternative 
decision criteria. The discussion of figures 4A, B, and C was not tied to the principle of 
expected utility maximization. Hence, the figures could be used to consider implications of 
the use of alternative decision criteria that are based on the economic principle of equalizing 
marginal costs and benefits, given beliefs about future states of the world. We will in this sub-
section indicate briefly how this could be analyzed in the framework of this paper, saving the 
in-depth analysis for our future work.  
The complexity of global warming makes it impossible to completely overlook the 
consequences of alternative choices. One might therefore ask whether this problem, which 
exhibits such severe forms of uncertainty, should be analyzed in a framework of ignorance, or 
at least partial ignorance. Theories of rational behavior under complete ignorance can be 
found for example in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Non-probabilistic criteria build on such a 
notion of ignorance. Critics of these criteria have put forward that the decision maker must at 
least have some vague partial information about the true state of nature (Luce and Raiffa 
1957). The question remains, however, if this vague partial information is sufficient to assign 
subjective probabilities to the possible states of the world. 
In Bretteville (2003) and Aaheim and Bretteville (2001), we examine the implication of the 
choice of a number of different decision criteria within a static setting for abatement 
investments. We found that there might be good reason to base climate policy on other 
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decision making criteria than maximization of expected utility. However, the conclusions 
from a static analysis of climate policy may change if the timing of policy, irreversibilities, 
and the possibility for learning are taken into account.  
The most well-known non-probabilistic criterion is perhaps the maximin principle (Rawls 
1971). This principle implies maximization of the welfare in the worst possible case, and 
essentially it allows risk aversion to become infinite. It has been claimed that the 
conservatism of the maximin principle makes good sense in the context of climate 
irreversibility. Chevé and Congar (2002), for instance, argue that maximin is consistent with 
the precautionary principle. However, knowing the actual nature of the worst case is 
problematic. Another problem with the maximin principle is that the worst case might be a 
catastrophe of such dimensions that deciding between policy options might have no 
significant impact on the outcome. A third problem is that the conclusion depends on what 
you define as the worst case. 
Applied to the problem of climate change, the maximin criterion can be interpreted as 
choosing the level of abatement that maximizes the social welfare in the worst possible state 
of the world. In the context of this paper, the worst state would mean that the decision in 
period 0 is based on both high damages and high abatement costs. If there is uncertainty 
attached to policy effectiveness, ‘early action’ cannot be rationalized as the appropriate 
maximin strategy because the worst case scenario would be to implement a costly remedial 
policy that fails to avert severe damages. Bouglet and Vergnaud (2000) analyzes the maximin 
criterion in a context of irreversibility theory and concludes that it does not necessarily lead to 
more flexible decisions than expected utility maximization. 
Minimax regret (/risk/loss), suggested by Savage (1951) as an improvement on the 
maximin criterion, aims at minimizing the difference between the best that could happen and 
what actually does happen. The decision-maker tries to minimize possible regrets for not 
having, in hindsight, made the superior choice. In this global warming example, it can be 
interpreted as choosing the strategy that minimizes the difference in benefits between 
guessing right and wrong. This is easily connected to the discussion in Section 4. We found 
that the effect of a possible option value of early abatement on the maximum regret is less the 
more irreversible investments are, but this last effect is smaller the longer the time horizon. 
The possible mistake of choosing a too low level of abatement in the initial period is thus 
reduced compared to the case with climate irreversibility only. The preferred policy option 
depends on the relative size of the two option values and the possible adjustment costs. If the 
sum of the climate option value and the adjustment costs due to too low initial abatement 
exceeds the sum of the investment option value and the adjustment costs due to too high 
initial abatement, the net option value is positive, and the maximum regret is minimized by 
choosing  ‘early action’  over the ‘wait-and-see’ policy.12  
 It is obvious from the discussion above that the probability distribution over states 
will influence the net option value, and thus the preferred policy.  Our model supposes two 
future scenarios. This can be interpreted as picking two of all the possible scenarios – one in 
the low cost range and one in the high cost range – or it could be interpreted as some sort of a 
mean or median in the two groups. Out model can thus be used as a framework for analyzing 
the Generalized Maximin/Maximax criterion, also known as the pessimism-optimism index 
criterion of Hurwicz (1951). This criterion states that the level of abatement should be chosen 
in order to maximize a weighted average of the net benefit in the best and the worst state. The 
size of the pessimism-optimism index (the weight) should reflect the decision-maker's beliefs 
about the probabilities of facing different future states of the world. Whether the net option 
value is positive or negative with this criterion depends on the choice of focus, which states 
12 Chevé and Congar (2002), however, claims that the minimax regret criterion is not consistent with 
the precautionary principle. 
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we choose as the worst and the best, and also the choice of weight. If the states in focus are 
the same as in the discussion above, the conclusions are, of course, unchanged.  
 Another criterion mentioned in the literature on decision-making under ignorance is 
the principle of insufficient reason, first formulated by Bernoulli in the 17th century. This 
criterion states that if there is no evidence leading us to believe that one event is more likely 
to occur than another, the events should be judged equally probable. In our model we have 
two possible scenarios, A and B, and they should thus each be assigned a probability of 0.5. 
In our two-period model with uncertainty and learning, this means that when we decide on the 
initial abatement we treat the two scenarios as equally likely, and when we decide on future 
abatement we have acquired new information and can adjust our emissions accordingly. If 
state B really is a low-probability extreme event, it would be weighted too heavily relative to 
the weight we would assign to it if we had had enough information to apply expected utility 
maximization. The occurrence of B is fortunate because then we are more likely able to 
increase our abatement sufficiently to avoid most of the damage. If the future optimal 
abatement turns out to be higher than the maximum, the climate irreversibility constraint will 
be encountered. If B does not occur, which is the most likely outcome, we did too much in the 
initial period and would thus like to increase emissions after learning the true state of nature. 
If future optimal abatement is less than zero, the investment irreversibility constraint is 
encountered. 
    Combinations of probabilistic and non-probabilistic criteria are also possible 
candidates for decision-making. The limited degree of confidence criterion is one example. It 
implies that we maximize a weighted sum of the expected utility criterion and the maximin 
criterion. The weight reflects the degree of confidence in the underlying probability 
distribution. In the case of full confidence, the weight is equal to 1 and the expected utility 
criterion is used, whereas under complete uncertainty the weight is equal to 0 and the 
maximin decision rule is applied. Lange (2003) compares expected utility with this criterion 
in a two-period model. He finds that more weight on the worst case (less weight on EU) may 
lead to increased first-period emissions and that the irreversibility effect holds if and only if 
the value of learning is negative. 
6 Concluding remarks 
Because of the option value of early abatement, a question arises of whether a more 
environmentally cautious policy initially (a policy based on beliefs of high future damages), 
could yield a higher expected benefit than a decision based on expected values. This depends 
on three factors: first, the size of the climate option value; second, the size of the investment 
option value; and third, the possible loss from deviating from the principle of maximizing 
expected utility. The net option value must thus exceed the expected value of this loss if a 
cautious initial policy is to be preferred.  
The model discussion showed that whether the social loss of an ‘early action’ policy 
exceeds the social loss of choosing ‘wait and see’, in the case of climate irreversibility only, 
depends on the option value of early abatement as well as the possible abatement adjustments 
resulting from initial period mistakes. The option value of early abatement depends on the 
probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint, which depends on the size of 
the maximum abatement in the future.  
Including irreversibility in abatement investments scales down the effects of climate 
irreversibility equivalent to the effect of an increase in the discount factor. Ceteris paribus this 
leads to an allocation of abatement from period 1 to period 0. Total abatement is, however, 
likely to go down. The possible mistake of choosing a too little abatement in period 0 is 
reduced compared to the case with irreversibility only in emissions of greenhouse gases. We 
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found that the effect of a possible option value of early abatement on the policy choice should 
be less the higher the option value of late investments, but that this effect is smaller the longer 
the time horizon.  
The option values relates only to the costs of encountering the irreversibility constraints. 
Under a process of learning, additional costs will occur because of adjustments desired as a 
result of new information. The option value of early abatement is realized only if the desired 
future abatement, after learning takes place, is higher than what is actually possible. Then the 
climate irreversibility constraint is binding. Similarly, the option value of late abatement is 
realized if the desired abatement investment, after learning takes place is negative. Then the 
irreversibility constraint on investment is binding. The loss imposed when encountering the 
irreversibility constraints adds to the costs of the uncertainty adjustments resulting from 
learning.  
Changes in the parameters will affect total abatement, as well as allocation between the 
periods. If q1α1 increases, total abatement goes up, and future abatement increases relative to 
present abatement. An increase in expected future period unit costs contributes to an 
allocation of abatement from the future to the present. An increase in the discount rate affects, 
in this model, only the abatement assigned to period 0 which is reduced. Some of the reduced 
abatement may be allocated to the future, but the total amount will most likely go down. 
Changes in uncertainty contribute to a reallocation of abatement from the present to the 
future. 
Choice of strategy in climate policy is not only a question of comparing costs, but also a 
choice of criterion. The choice of criterion will to a large degree influence policy choice and 
is therefore a political question. The model in this paper is applicable for analyzing and 
comparing alternatives to expected utility maximization. For example, if the choice between 
criteria is subject to a comparison between the required adjustment costs under extreme 
outcomes, the model can be used to attach relative numerical values to alternative strategies. 
This is a subject for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Implications of the constants of a mean-preserving spread of risk 
The constants on which the optimal solution is based are all subject to uncertainty in damage 
costs and abatement costs. Each constant will, however, be affected differently depending on 
which variable is subject to uncertainty. As a consequence, also the value of abatement will 
change when the policy is adjusted to account for new information, depending on the nature 
of this information. Below follows a discussion of how a mean-preserving spread of risk will 
affect the constants defined in Section 4. This affects, in particular, how the abatement is 
adjusted when new information arrives in period 1.  
 
In general, the constants in chapter 4 can be represented by three categories of expected 
values: 
 
  , (A1) BA xxEX )1( ππ −+=
 
which applies for all the constants when there is uncertainty only in the damage costs; 
 
 
 BA yy
EX 1)1(1 ππ −+= , (A2) 
 
which applies for C1, ψ0 and ψ1 when there is uncertainty in the damage costs; and 
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which applies for Ф1 when there is uncertainty in the damage costs. 
 
A mean-preserving spread of risk means that dX = πdxA + (1-π)dxB = 0, or dxB = -π/(1-π) dxA. 
Hence, for (A1), dEX = 0 by definition. That is, the expected value is unaffected by a mean-
preserving spread of risk in damage costs, if the abatement costs are certain. 
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For (A2), we have 
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Therefore, dEX is positive or negative depending on whether yA is higher or lower than yB. If 
we talk about a spread of risk, dyA will be negative if yA is lower than yB, and vice versa. 
Therefore, dEX will increase with ‘more’ uncertainty in the abatement costs. 
 
For (A3), we have 
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Since a spread of risk means that dyA < 0 if yA is lower than yB and vice versa, dEX > 0 when 
the uncertainty in abatement costs increases. 
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Appendix 2 
Sensitivity analysis - A numerical example 
In this numerical example we have, as far as possible, tried to base the choice of parameters 
on assumptions that seem to be standard in studies of optimal climate policy. The simple 
structure of the model in this paper nevertheless implies that the results can only be 
considered as illustrations.  
Each period counts 25 years, making coverage of the period 2000 to 2050. We assume that 
the ‘business-as-usual’ emissions grow between 1.5 and 2.5 percent per year, proportional to 
the growth in GDP. What this implies for the exogenous variables e0 and e1 is not easy to say. 
This is because the model expresses emissions in units of concentrations, but it does not 
include a natural rate of decay in the concentrations. Hence, using the sum of emissions 
would, first, exaggerate the contribution to concentrations, and second, disregard the fact that 
emissions contribute less to concentrations the higher the concentrations are. We have 
therefore replaced emissions with additions to concentrations in each period from the chosen 
emissions assumption. The natural decay was set to 1/250, which is an approximation of the 
CO2 decay rate in the long run. 
The unit cost of abatement is based on an assumption that reducing emissions by 10 percent 
costs 0.75 percent of GDP. This is relatively high compared with other studies. For the 
damage costs, we assume 5 percent of GDP at a concentrations level of 550 ppmv. Again, this 
is high. The reason for choosing an upper level for both is that we assume that the policy is to 
be implemented for the entire world, whereas most cost estimates apply for developed 
countries, assuming that only these countries abate under the allowance of trading and CDM 
engagement. 
The assumed unit cost of abatement corresponds to a cost lower than 0.5 USD/tC. This is 
extremely low compared with estimates of marginal costs in other studies (see e.g. IPPC, 
2001). The reason is that we assume a constant unit cost of abatement, which means that the 
cost represents the average, rather than marginal cost, which is usually reported. The damage 
resulting cost per unit of concentrations is approximately 2 USD/ppmv. Based on the 
assumption for the damage costs, the constant of the damage cost function was set to 0.0015. 
The base case for our numerical example is thus: 
y_hat e0 e1 c0 c1A c1B 
368 63 116 1.15 1.1 1.3 
 
q0alpha0 q1alpha1A q1alpha1B pi  r 
0.001 0.0015 0.0019 0.5 1.75 
 
To show how sensitive the abatement decisions are to changes in the exogenous variables, we 
have made some calculations based on variations in one variable at the time illustrated in the 
figures below. First we examine the implication of increasing q1α1 in the damage function. 
Figure A shows how the sum of the abatement in the two periods change with changes in q1α1 
for state A, which is the low damage scenario, for three different values of π. Recall that π is 
the probability of state A. 
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Figure A 
 
Similarily, Figure B shows the development in total abatement when q1α1 for state B 
increases. State B is the high damage cost scenario. 
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Figure B 
 
The next two figures show the how the allocation of abatement between the two periods, as 
well as the total amount of abatement, changes with q1α1 for state A (Figure C) and state B 
(Figure D) respectively, when the probability of state A is 0.5. 
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Figure C 
 
Increased q1alpha1HI: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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Figure D 
 
In the same fashion, we have computed changes in abatement when the abatement cost in 
period 1 increases, first in the low-cost scenario (A), and second for the high-cost scenario 
(B). Figures E and F show the development in total abatement in the two cases for three 
different values of π. 
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Figure E 
 
Increasing c1HI
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Figure F 
Figures G and H show the changes in total abatement and how abatement is allocated from 
period 1 to period 0 when the future abatement costs increase and the probability of state A is 
0.5. 
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Figure G 
 
Increased c1HI: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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Figure H 
 
Lastly we will show the implications on abatement decisions of changes in the discount rate. 
Figure I shows changes in total abatement for three different values of π. 
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Figure I 
 
Figure J shows the allocation abatement for π=0.5. When the discount rate increases 
abatement is allocated from the present to the future, while the total amount is constant. 
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Figure J 
 
